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  Abstract 
 
Collateral  is  a  widely  used,  but  not  well  understood,  debt  contracting  feature.    Two  broad  strands  of 
theoretical literature explain collateral as arising from the existence of either ex ante private information or ex 
post incentive problems between borrowers and lenders.  However, the extant empirical literature has been 
unable to isolate each of these effects.  This paper attempts to do so using a credit registry that is unique in 
that it allows the researcher to have access to some private information about borrower risk that is unobserved 
by the lender.  The data also includes public information about borrower risk, loan contract terms, and ex post 
performance for both secured and unsecured loans.  The results suggest that the ex post theories of collateral 
are empirically dominant, although the ex ante theories are also valid for customers with short borrower-
lender relationships that are relatively unknown to the lender.   
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Tests of Ex Ante versus Ex Post Theories of Collateral using Private and Public Information 
 
I.  Introduction 
Collateral is a prominent feature of debt contracts.  Residential and commercial mortgages, motor 
vehicle and equipment loans, and inter-bank repurchase agreements all rely heavily on readily marketable 
assets to secure funding.  Interestingly, commercial loans only sometimes require collateral and the pledged 
assets tend to be quite heterogeneous.   
The use of collateral in debt contracts can be costly for lenders, borrowers, and (in some cases) even 
society  at  large.    Lenders  incur  costs  of  screening  and  monitoring  the  pledged  assets,  as  well  as  any 
enforcement and disposal expenses in the case of repossession (e.g., Leeth and Scott 1989).  Collateral may 
also impose opportunity costs on borrowers by tying up assets that might otherwise be put to more productive 
uses.
1  As well, borrowers can suffer fluctuations in their credit availability as the values of their securable 
assets vary, particularly for loans secured by accounts receivable and/or inventory.  In certain circumstances, 
collateral may also result in social costs (externalities) when changes in the value of widely pledged assets, 
like real estate, are correlated across borrowers and act to amplify the business cycle through procyclical 
changes in access to credit (e.g., Bernanke and Gertler 1989, 1990, Kiyatoki and Moore 1997).  Recent 
research suggests that the significant decline in real estate collateral values in Japan in the early 1990s played 
an important role in reducing debt capacity and investment in that nation (Gan 2007).  A similar procyclical 
effect may have occurred in the U.S. and other nations during the recent financial crisis, triggered in 2007 by 
the collapse in real estate collateral values.   
Given that collateral is costly and yet widely employed, it is natural to inquire as to the economic 
functions  of  this  contracting  tool.    Economic  theory  largely  explains  collateral  as  an  attempt  to  either 
compensate  for ex ante  asymmetric  information  or  as  a  method  of reducing ex  post  incentive  problems.  
Specifically,  one  set  of  theoretical  models  explains  collateral  as  arising  from  ex  ante  information  gaps 
between borrowers and lenders that can otherwise lead to an equilibrium characterized by adverse selection 
                                                 
1 Renegotiations, which are frequent in private debt agreements (Smith, 1993), limit the cases in which assets are tied up 
in less productive uses and hence limit the opportunity costs to the borrower.   2
and credit rationing in the spirit of Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).  In this case, collateral allows lenders to sort 
observationally equivalent loan applicants through signaling.  Specifically, lenders offer a menu of contract 
terms such that observationally equivalent applicants with higher-quality projects choose secured debt with 
lower risk premiums, while those with lower-quality projects self-select into unsecured debt with higher risk 
premiums (e.g., Bester 1985, 1987, Besanko and Thakor 1987a, 1987b, Chan and Thakor 1987, Boot, Thakor, 
and Udell 1991).  A second set of theoretical models motivates collateral as part of an optimal debt contract 
by invoking ex post frictions.  These may include moral hazard concerns (e.g., Boot, Thakor, and Udell 1991, 
Boot and  Thakor  1994, Aghion  and Bolton 1997,  Holmstrom  and  Tirole 1997);  difficulties  in enforcing 
contracts  (e.g.,  Banerjee  and  Newman  1993,  Albuquerque  and  Hopenhayn  2004,  Cooley,  Marimon,  and 
Quadrini 2004); and costly state verification (e.g., Townsend 1979, Gale and Hellwig 1985, Williamson 1986, 
Boyd and Smith 1994).  Overall, the ex post theories predict that observably riskier borrowers are more likely 
to be required to pledge collateral. 
In  this  paper,  we  test  the  empirical  predictions  generated  by  both  the  ex  ante  private-
information/signaling models and the ex post models where collateral is used to overcome borrower/lender 
incentive conflicts.  Our empirical test attempts to identify the effect of the two sets of theories by studying 
variation  in  the  incidence  of  collateral  pledges  at  loan  origination.    This  test  exploits  differences  in 
information that is available within a credit registry (and known to us) versus the information the registry 
discloses to prospective lenders.  This provides us with clean measures of “private information” (information 
known to borrowers, but not to lenders) and “public information” (information known to both borrowers and 
lenders) with which to test the relevance of the two broad sets of collateral theories. By way of preview, our 
results are consistent with both sets of collateral theories, although the ex ante private information theories 
appear  only  to  hold  for  borrowers  that  are  relatively  unknown  to  the  lender  (i.e.,  borrowers  with  short 
relationships).     
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows.  Section II provides a review of the related 
empirical literature.  Section III describes the credit registry data and information sharing regime.  Section IV   3
outlines our empirical test and presents the results.  Additional evidence is presented in Section V and Section 
VI concludes. 
 
II.  Empirical Literature Review 
Some of the extant empirical literature pertaining to collateral, studies how collateral incidence relates 
to measures of borrower risk and proxies for private information.  Consistent with the ex post theories, several 
studies find that observably riskier borrowers are more likely to pledge collateral.  One study finds positive 
relations between financial leverage and collateral (Brick and Palia 2007), another finds that firms with better 
public ratings are less likely to pledge collateral (Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux 2004), and four others 
find positive relations between collateral and past observed repayment problems (Harhoff and Korting 1998; 
Chakraborty and Hu 2006, Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina 2006, and Brick and Palia 2007).   
Studies  testing  theories  concerning  the  importance  of  ex  ante  private  information  as  a  driver  of 
collateral decisions have been much less successful.  Many studies examine the effect of lender-borrower 
relationship strength on collateral incidence.  The idea here is that stronger relationships (in terms of length, 
breadth,  or  intensity)  will  result  in  private  information  being  revealed  about  the  firm  as  lenders  gather 
proprietary information about the borrower’s character, reliability, and project choice over time (e.g., Petersen 
and Rajan 1994, Berger and Udell 1995, Degryse and van Cayseele 2000).  However, the effect of access to 
private  information  on  collateral  pledges  is  ambiguous  since  this  information  may  be  favorable  or 
unfavorable.  The ex ante theories predict that unobservably safer borrowers pledge collateral.
2  
Not surprisingly, empirical tests of the role of relationship strength in determining whether collateral 
is pledged are mixed.  Berger and Udell (1995), Harhoff and Korting (1998), Chakraborty and Hu (2006), and 
                                                 
2 Furthermore, at least three other biases may influence the interpretation of these results.  First, the more opaque the firm 
is, the more valuable is the private information to the lender – potentially leading to an information monopoly or “lock-
in” effect that would manifest itself through positive relations (e.g., Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia 1989, Sharpe 
1990, Rajan 1992).  Second, a bias towards a positive association between collateral and relationship strength may occur 
if lenders use relationship lending technology for their most opaque borrowers (e.g., Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and 
Miller  2010).    Finally,  the  results  could  be  biased  toward  a  negative  association  to  the  extent  that  collateral  and 
relationships are substitute methods of dealing with opacity problems (e.g., Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, and Miller 
2010). 
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Brick and Palia (2007) each reports finding that stronger relationships are inversely related to the incidence of 
collateral  for  loans  drawn  under  lines  of  credit.    Chakraborty  and  Hu  (2006)  also  find  that  collateral  is 
negatively related to relationship scope defined as the total number of financial services used by the firm.  By 
contrast, several studies report that the incidence of collateral is positively related to an indicator of “main 
bank” or “house bank” (Machauer and Weber 1998, Elsas and Krahnen 2000, Degryse and Van Cayseele 
2000, Lehmann and Neuberger 2001, and Menkhoff, Neuberger, and Suwanaporn 2006).  Consistent with 
these latter studies, Ono and Uesugi (2009) find that relationship length is positively related to collateral for a 
sample of small Japanese firms. 
More recent studies attempt to find other proxies for private information with which to test the ex ante 
theories of collateral.  One study examines differences in informational opacity across borrowers, finding that 
more transparent firms are less likely to pledge collateral.  Specifically, Gonas, Highfield, and Mullineaux 
(2004)  find  that  large  exchange-listed  firms  and  those  with  public  debt  ratings  are  less  likely  to  pledge 
collateral for bank loans.  Another study exploits variation in lender information sets brought about by the use 
of credit scoring technology and finds that it reduces the incidence of collateral (Berger, Espinosa-Vega, 
Frame,  and  Miller  2010).    While  each  of  these  studies  succeeds  in  better  identifying  variation  in  the 
information environment across borrowers or lenders, none identifies borrower-specific private information as 
being favorable or unfavorable, and therefore none directly tests the key empirical implication of the ex ante 
theories.   
One recent study attempts to do this using ex post default as a measure of ex ante adverse private 
information,  finding  that  this  measure  is  negatively  related  to  the  probability  of  pledging  collateral  at 
origination for young firms (Jimenez, Salas, and Saurina 2006).  However, because collateral may raise the 
borrower’s cost of default, one might expect to find that secured debt is less likely to default, irrespective of 
whether ex ante asymmetric information is important.  Moreover, defaults may reflect moral hazard or other 
ex post frictions, and thus may not isolate the effects of ex ante private information.   
Our methods improve upon this literature through the availability of data that allows us to empirically 
isolate the alternative theories of collateral: ex ante private information versus ex post contracting frictions.    5
Specifically, our test exploits differences in information that is available within a credit registry (and known to 
us) versus the information the registry discloses to prospective lenders.  This provides us with clean measures 
of private and public information with which to test the relevance of the two sets of collateral theories.   
 
III.  Data and Information Environment 
Our analysis utilizes data from the Central de Información de Riesgos Crediticios (CIRC), the public 
credit registry of Bolivia, provided by the Bolivian Superintendent of Banks and Financial Entities (SBEF). 
Since CIRC’s creation in 1989, the SBEF requires all formal (licensed and regulated) financial institutions 
operating in Bolivia to record information on all loans.  Our sample covers the entire credit registry for the 
period  between  January  1998  and  December  2003.    For  each  loan,  we  have  information  on  the  date  of 
origination, maturity date, contract terms, and ex post performance through the sample period.  For each 
borrower, we have information about their industry, physical location, legal structure, banking relationships, 
and whether they have been delinquent or defaulted on a loan in the recent past.   
The SBEF requires that some loan information is shared among the participating institutions to help 
alleviate  the  otherwise  pervasive  information  asymmetries  in  the  Bolivian  credit  markets.    After  written 
authorization from a prospective customer, a lender can access the registry and obtain a credit report, which 
contains information on all outstanding loans of the customer for the previous two months.  Entries include 
originating  bank,  loan  amount,  type  of  loan,  value  of  collateral,  value  of  overdue  payments,  and  the 
borrower’s credit rating from the originating bank.  Loans with overdue payments remain in the registry until 
they are paid off, even if they are past maturity.  This implies that delinquencies in the past two months and 
past defaults from any previous period are observable to other lenders through the registry.  By contrast, 
delinquencies that were paid off more than two months ago are not observable to other lenders through the 
registry (Campion 2001).   
An  underlying assumption that we maintain in the paper is that at least some of the information about 
past delinquencies does not become observable through other sources.  There are several reasons why we 
think that this is a reasonable assumption.  First, during the sample period, there was no other credit registry   6
operational in Bolivia (de Janvry, Sadoulet, McIntosh, Wydick, Luoto, Gordillo, and Schuetz 2003).  Second, 
Bolivian credit markets are quite opaque; the vast majority of firms do not have audited financial statements 
and  the  quality  of  existing  financial  statements  is  poor  as  many  firms  engage  in  tax  evasion  (Sirtaine, 
Skamnelos, and Frank 2004).  Third, evidence presented in Ioannidou and Ongena (forthcoming) is consistent 
with the assumption that at least some of this information remains unobserved as borrowers appear to use the 
two-month disclosure window strategically.  The authors find that banks are unwilling to extend credit to new 
customers with observable repayment problems and that borrowers trying to switch to new banks clear due 
payments  on  their  outstanding  loans  for  those  two  months,  manage  to  switch,  but  tend  to  return  to 
nonperformance soon thereafter.   
By having access to the entire credit registry, this information-sharing regime allows us to construct 
our indicators of observed and unobserved borrower risk – our key independent variables for testing the two 
collateral theories.  We construct three indicators of observed risk: a dummy variable that equals one if the 
loan  is  given  to  a  borrower  that  defaulted
3  with  any  bank  in  the  previous  twelve  months 
(Default_Observable_Registry),  a  dummy  variable  that  equals  one  if  the  borrower  had  been  30+  days 
delinquent with any bank in the previous two months (Npl_Observable_Registry), and a dummy variable that 
equals one if the loan is given to a borrower that had been 30+ days delinquent with the same bank anytime 
from three to twelve months prior (Npl_Observable_Relationship).  To measure unobserved risk, we create a 
dummy variable that equals one if the borrower had 30+ day delinquencies at other banks three to twelve 
months prior to the loan origination (Npl_Unobservable).  Note that our empirical results below are materially 
unchanged if we expand the performance horizon back 18 or 24 months.   
The  data  include  loans  from  commercial  banks  and  non-bank  financial  institutions  (e.g.,  private 
financial funds, credit unions, mutual societies, and general deposit warehouses).  To keep the set of lenders 
homogenous in terms of financial structure and regulation, we focus exclusively on commercial loans granted 
                                                 
3 “Default” occurs when the overdue payments are persistent enough for the bank to downgrade a loan to a rating of five 
and  write-off  the  overdue  amount.    According  to  regulations,  small  loans  (with  an  average  amount  smaller  than 
US$75,000) are downgraded to five if there are overdue payments for at least 121 days for secured loans and 91 days for 
unsecured loans.  Large loans, by contrast, are downgraded to five when the borrower is considered insolvent (i.e., when 
the borrower’s net worth is close to zero).  In the sensitivity analysis below, we investigate the robustness of our findings 
by re-estimating our models separately for loans with contract amounts above or below US$75,000.   7
by commercial banks between March 1999 and December 2003.
4  Table 1 provides a list of the 13 commercial 
banks that  were  active  in  Bolivia  during the  sample period,  seven  of  which  were  foreign  owned – four 
branches and three subsidiaries.
5  As shown in Table 1, five banks dominated the Bolivian banking sector 
during this time – each with total assets averaging at least US$500 million and with more than 10 percent 
market share of deposits and loans.  The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for deposits is 1,292 and for loans it is 
1,236, suggesting moderate market concentration.  
Over the 1998 to 2003 period, the Bolivian economy slowed markedly due to the Russian/Asian 
financial crises, which resulted in currency depreciations for many emerging market currencies – including the 
Bolivian Peso.
6  Note that while Bolivian bank assets and liabilities were largely denominated in U.S. dollars, 
wages and business income were largely paid in domestic currency.  Hence, the currency depreciation had the 
effect of inflating debt-to-income ratios for consumers and firms – sending some into financial distress.  As a 
result, bank balance sheets shrunk due to deposit withdrawals and weakened loan demand, and nonperforming 
loans  increased.
7  Despite the weakened  macroeconomic and banking environment  in Bolivia during our 
sample  period,  bank  capital  adequacy  ratios  remained  above  the  10  percent  minimum  requirement  and 
actually increased over time – owing to shrinking balance sheets and government intervention in the form of 
low-cost loans and capital injections via subordinated debt (Sirtaine, Skamelos, and Frank 2004).   
There are several types of commercial credit contracts in the data, including credit cards, overdrafts, 
installment loans, discount loans, and lines of credit.  We focus exclusively on installment loans and discount 
loans and refer to these as “standard debt contracts.”  These contracts account for 92 percent of the total value 
                                                 
4 Although we have data as of January 1998, we start our sample in March 1999 since prior to this date the data do not 
allow us to distinguish been commercial and consumer loans.  However, we use the prior information from January 1998 
through February 1999 to help fill in history on loans and relationships that existed as of March 1999. 
 
5 Foreign-owned banks operating in Bolivia have similar rights and responsibilities as domestically-owned institutions.  
One of the foreign branches, ABN Amro, left the Bolivian market in November 2000. 
 
6 The average annual growth rate of real GDP in Bolivia during the sample period was 2.2 percent, ranging between 0.7 
and 3.7 percent.   
 
7 Bolivian nonperforming bank loans increased from US$172 million (4.3 percent of total loans) in March 1999 to a peak 
of US$570 million (20.3 percent of total loans) in June 2003.   
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of commercial loans during the sample period.  Of these contracts, 98 percent are denominated in U.S. dollars, 
and we use only these loans in our analysis.  
Our sample encompasses 32,286 bank loans made to 2,676 different firms.  A loan is defined by a 
unique identification code (loan id) and a date of origination.  This includes new loans to new or existing 
customers, but also renegotiations of previous loans.  Banks, however, are required to indicate whether a new 
loan is a renegotiation of a previous (performing or nonperforming) loan and we use this information to 
exclude renegotiations.
8  We also do not include as new loans drawn on pre-existing lines of credit.
9   
Table 2 provides variable names, definitions, and summary statistics for all loans in the sample and 
for secured and unsecured loans separately.
10  Collateral was pledged for 24.4 percent of the loans in the 
sample.  As in the U.S., secured debt in Bolivia has effective priority over unsecured debt in bankruptcy (see 
Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer 2007).
11  Of the 29,485 loans that matured before the end of the sample 
period, 6.4 percent had ex post delinquencies or defaults, with secured loans having a substantially higher 
incidence of repayment problems (9.1 percent as opposed to 5.5 percent for unsecured loans), suggesting that 
banks require collateral from riskier borrowers.  The data also indicate that only 0.3 percent of the sample 
loans were given to borrowers that had defaulted in the prior twelve months (Default_Observable_Registry).  
This suggests that borrowers that default rarely get another loan, either because they are credit rationed or 
cease to exist as a going concern.  Some 5.7 percent of the loans were issued to firms that had been delinquent 
with any bank in the two prior months (Npl_Observable_Registry).  The data also show that 7.4 percent of the 
                                                 
8 To the extent that some renegotiations are not recorded (either because of reporting errors or because banks do that 
intentionally to reduce their loan loss reserves), our sample would include some renegotiations as new loans.  Hence, in 
the sensitivity analysis below we try to control for this possibility by dropping all “suspected renegotiations” from our 
sample. 
 
9 When a borrower draws on a pre-existing line of credit, a “new loan” appears in the registry with origination date and 
contract terms as of the date the bank originated the credit line.  Since the date the loan first appears in the registry is 
subsequent to the origination date, we can identify when a “new loan” is a draw on a pre-existing line of credit and 
exclude it from our sample. 
 
10 For relationship length, loan amount, and maturity we report summary statistics for the level of these variables, but our 
empirical models (below) incorporate the natural logarithm of one plus the level. 
  
11 The data used in Djankov, McLiesh, and Shleifer (2007) are available at: 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/shleifer/dataset. 
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credits were issued to firms that had been delinquent with the same bank anytime from three to twelve months 
prior  (Npl_Observable_Relationship).    Finally,  14.0  percent  of  loans  were  given  to  borrowers  with 
delinquencies at other banks from three to twelve months prior to the loan origination (Npl_Unobservable).  
As mentioned earlier, this last information item is not revealed to the lender through the credit registry but, as 
our empirical analysis below suggests, it might be revealed through lending relationships.   
Turning to the control variables, the average banking relationship in the sample is 23.1 months.  This 
is defined as the number of months since the first loan of this borrower from this bank in the registry since 
January 1998.  Most of the sample firms are corporations (71.4 percent), while partnerships (14.0 percent) and 
sole proprietorships (12.5 percent) are much less common.  Almost one-half of the sample is comprised of 
installment loans.  The average loan amount is US$161,490 and the average loan maturity is about 12 months.  
As expected, secured and unsecured loans have different contract terms.  On average, secured loans are more 
than twice as large and have maturities that are six months longer. 
 
IV.  Empirical Analysis 
  Our  empirical  test  relates  the  incidence  of  collateral  to  measures  of  observed  and  unobserved 
borrower risk, the length of the banking relationship, loan- and firm-level control variables, and bank and time 
fixed effects.  This model, which is estimated using Probit, can be summarized as: 
 
P(Collateralijt) =  f( Observed_Riskijt, Unobserved_Riskijt, Unobserved_Riskijt*Rel_Lengthijt,  
     Rel_Lengthijt,  Firmijt , Loanijt, ,aj,, gt )                                (1) 
 
where P(·) indicates probability, Collateralijt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan is secured, and i, j, 
and t index loans, banks, and time, respectively.  The key exogenous variables are those capturing observed 
and unobserved borrower risk as we defined in Table 2.  Specifically, Observed_Riskijt is comprised of the 
three  dummy  variables  that  indicate  the  observed  riskiness  of  the  borrower  at  loan  origination: 
Default_Observable_Registry,  Npl_Observable_Registry,  and  Npl_Observable_Relationship.    10
Unobserved_Riskijt is comprised of a single dummy variable, Npl_Unobservable.  As mentioned earlier, this 
variable is in the credit registry and thus available to us, but not available to the lender.  By using these four 
indicators of  borrower  risk,  we  essentially  assume  that past  performance,  observable or  unobservable,  is 
predictive of future performance.  That is, we assume that borrowers with past repayment problems are more 
likely to have delinquencies or defaults on future loans.  The Appendix demonstrates that this is indeed the 
case.   
    A positive, statistically and economically significant coefficient for any of the three variables included 
in Observed_Riskijt would be evidence in favor of the ex post theories.  That is, observably risky borrowers are 
more likely to be required by lenders to post collateral.  By contrast, a negative, statistically and economically 
significant coefficient on Unobserved_Riskijt would be consistent with the ex ante theories.  That is, according 
to  models  of  signaling,  firms  with  private  information  that  they  are  “good”  are  more  likely  to  pledge 
collateral.  As mentioned earlier such a finding would require that the Unobserved_Riskijt variable does not 
indirectly become observable  through other sources.  For example, some of this  information  might have 
become known to the lender if the borrower previously applied for a loan to the same bank that was not 
granted or if this information is demanded in loan applications.  To the extent that this occurs, it would bias 
our results against finding evidence consistent with the ex ante theories.  In fact, in the limiting case in which 
all of the information in Unobserved_Riskijt becomes observable to the originating bank, we should find that 
the estimated coefficient of Unobserved_Riskijt is positive and statistically significant. 
To account for the likelihood that a firm’s private information declines in the length of the bank-firm 
relationship,  we  also  include the  interaction  term  Unobserved_Riskijt*Rel_Lengthijt, where  Rel_Lengthijt is 
measured as the natural logarithm of one plus the number of months that we observe the bank and borrower in 
a relationship.  We expect that the empirical relevance of the ex ante theories diminishes as the length of a 
bank-firm  relationship  increases,  suggesting  a  negative  coefficient  for  Unobserved_Riskijt  and  a  positive 
coefficient  for  Unobserved_Riskijt*Rel_Lengthijt.    In  other  words,  borrowers  with  favorable  private 
information choose to pledge collateral to signal their quality only when relationships are short and the bank   11
does not know their quality.  Finally, if relationships mitigate informational asymmetries, the coefficient of 
Rel_Lengthijt should be negative. 
  The vector Firmijt accounts for differences in firm characteristics such as legal structure, industry, and 
region.  We use a set of dummy variables indicating the legal structure of the firm: Partnership, Corporation, 
and Other (Sole_Proprietorship is the omitted group).  Industry is a set of 18 dummy variables controlling for 
the firm’s industry classification (like the SIC or NAICS codes).  Region is a set of dummy variables that 
indicate the location from which the bank originated the loan.  This includes nine regions in Bolivia as well as 
Argentina, Paraguay, Panama, and the United States.   
The vector Loanijt accounts for differences in the individual loan contract terms.  However, each of 
these terms could be determined simultaneously with collateral, and is potentially endogenous.  We therefore 
estimate our empirical models both with and without these variables.  Installment is a dummy variable equal 
to one if the contract is an installment loan rather than a discount loan.  Loan_Amount is measured as the 
natural logarithm of one plus the amount of the loan proceeds at origination in U.S. dollars.  Maturity is the 
natural logarithm of one plus the number of months between loan origination and maturity.  We explicitly 
exclude the loan interest rate since it is jointly determined with collateral under the ex ante theories.  
Bank and time (month) fixed effects are also included in the model, represented by the scalars aj and 
gt, respectively.  Bank fixed effects should capture any systematic differences in bank propensities to require 
collateral for their commercial loans.  The time fixed effects are intended to account for temporal differences 
in required collateral related to the business or credit cycle.  Accounting for such variation may be important 
given the volatile macro-financial environment in Bolivia during the period under study. 
Estimation  results  are  presented  in  Table  3.    In  Column  I,  we  report  a  benchmark  specification 
without interaction terms and loan characteristics.  In Column II, we include the interaction term between the 
length of a bank-firm relationship and unobserved risk, and in Column III, we also add loan characteristics.  
Under the heading Probit Coefficients, we report the estimated coefficients of the three Probit specifications.  
Under the heading Marginal Effects, we report the change in probability of pledging collateral for each one of 
the independent variables, holding all other independent variables at their sample means.  For continuous   12
variables, we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in the variable; and for dummy variables we report 
the estimated effect of a change from 0 to 1. 
  In all three specifications, our three indicators of observed risk are positively associated with the 
incidence of collateral.  These findings are consistent with the ex post theories, under which observably riskier 
borrowers are asked to pledge collateral to mitigate frictions such as moral hazard.  Each of these indicators of 
previous delinquencies or defaults is estimated to be associated with a 3.9 to 12.8 percentage point estimated 
increase in the probability of collateral being pledged.  These findings are economically significant, given that 
the predicted probability of collateral at the mean of all independent variables (P0) is only about 20%.   
The estimated coefficient of Unobserved Risk is neither statistically neither economically significant 
in Column I.  However, when we include the interaction term between unobserved risk and relationship 
length, the measured effect of unobserved risk becomes both statistically and economically significant.  For 
“new”  borrowers,  for  whom  relationship  length  is  zero,  unobserved  risk  is  associated  with  13.7  to  17.0 
percentage point decrease in the probability of collateral, consistent with the ex ante theories.  Combining the 
marginal  effects  of  Unobserved  Risk  and  the  interaction  term  suggests  that  the  effect  is  negative  for 
relationships under approximately seven months.
12,13  This is consistent with a reduction in private information 
with longer relationships.
14  Thus, the data suggest that the ex ante theories only hold for loans to borrowers 
with  relatively  short  relationships  when  asymmetric  information  problems  are  more  likely  to  be  present.  
Relationship  length  itself  is  significantly  negatively  related  to  the  incidence  of  collateral.    This  is  also 
consistent with the literature that banking relationships assist in resolving asymmetric information problems.   
The incidence of collateral is lower for loans to partnerships or corporations than for those to sole 
proprietorships  (the  omitted  category),  consistent  with  collateral  being  more  likely  for  opaque  firms.  
                                                 
12 In Column II, the effect of unobserved risk equals zero for relationship length x when -0.17+0.082*ln(1+x)=0, which is 
solved for x equal to 6.9.  For the estimates in Column III, the corresponding x equals 6.7. 
 
13 This is consistent with Cole (1998), who finds that most of the borrower information is collected within the first year 
of a relationship. 
 
14 One way in which private information might be revealed to the bank when relationships are longer is through past 
draws on the credit registry. 
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Installment loans are less likely to have collateral pledged, but larger loans and those with longer maturities 
are more likely to be associated with collateral pledges. 
We  conduct  four  robustness  checks.    First,  we  include  a  number  of  additional  relationship 
characteristics to the specification reported in Column II of Table 3.  Specifically, we include a dummy 
variable for multiple banking relationships, a dummy variable for when the bank is the firm’s primary lender 
(i.e., more than 50 percent of outstanding loan balances are from that bank), and a dummy variable for the 
existence of other lending products such as other loans, credit cards, credit lines, and overdrafts in the current 
account.  The empirical results are materially unchanged by including additional relationship metrics. 
Second, we estimate the model separately for installment and discount loans.  The results are very 
similar  to  those  reported  in  Column  II  of  Table  3.    One  difference  is  that  the  estimated  coefficients  of 
Default_Observable_Registry  and  Npl_Observable_Relationship  in  the  discount  loans  equations  are  not 
statistically significant.  However, the estimated coefficient of the third indicator of observed borrower risk, 
Npl_Observable_Registry, remains positive and statistically significant, supporting the ex post theories.   
Third, we estimate the model separately for loans with contract amounts above and below US$75,000.  
The  results  are  very  similar  to  those  reported  earlier,  with  the  exception  of  the  coefficient  of 
Default_Observable_Registry that is not statistically significant in the sample of loans with a contract amount 
below US$75,000.   
Finally, we include the loan interest rate at origination to the vector of loan characteristics included in 
the specification reported in Column III of Table 3.  While the interest rate is found to have negative and 
statistically significant relations with the incidence of collateral, including this variable had no material effect 
on our results.     
 
V.  Additional Evidence  
We believe that studying the effects of observed and unobserved borrower risk on the incidence of 
collateral is the most appropriate way for empirically testing the two sets of collateral theories because it 
allows identification of the individual effects.  There is, however, an empirical literature that relates measures   14
of borrower risk (such as the loan risk premium and ex post loan performance) to whether or not collateral was 
pledged for a given credit.  In this case, one might be able to surmise whether the ex ante private information 
theories or the ex post incentive conflict models dominate empirically, but only under certain circumstances.   
Most of the studies relating borrower risk to the incidence of collateral use the risk premium paid on 
the credit (yield less the risk free rate) as the borrower risk measure.  Several studies report positive relations 
between  risk  premiums  and  collateral  pledges  (Berger  and  Udell  1990,  Blackwell  and  Winters  1997, 
Machauer and Weber 1998, John, Lynch, and Puri 2003, and Brick and Palia 2007); although two other 
studies report negative relations (Degryse and Van Cayseele 2000, Lehmann and Neuberger 2001).  Jimenez 
and Saurina (2004), on the other hand, use ex post loan nonperformance as measure of borrower risk and find 
that loan defaults are positively related to collateral pledges.
15   
For comparative purposes, we estimate similar empirical relations using loan risk premiums and ex 
post  loan  nonperformance  as  risk  measures.    We  define  Risk_Premiumijt  as  the  loan  interest  rate  (at 
origination)  minus  the  rate  on  the  six-month  U.S.  Treasury  bill  at  the  end  of  the  same  month.
16  
Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijt is a dummy variable that equals one if the loan eventually becomes delinquent or 
defaults.
17  Both of these measures are regressed on a dummy variable indicating that collateral was pledged, 
the length of the banking relationship, the interaction of these two variables, loan- and firm-level control 
variables, and bank and time fixed effects as summarized below:  
 
Risk_Premiumijt = g( Collateralijt, Collateralijt*Rel_Lengthijt,Rel_Lengthijt,  Firmijt, Loanijt,aj,, gt )    (2) 
 
                                                 
15 In an earlier study, Berger and Udell (1990) use bank-level data to study the association between the quality of the loan 
portfolio and the proportion of loans that were collateralized. 
 
16 The six-month U.S. Treasury rate is used because the median loan in the sample has a maturity of seven months and all 
loans are denominated in U.S. dollars.  Estimating relations using the rate on the three-month Treasury bill had no 
material effect on the results.  
 
17 For consistency with Jimenez and Saurina (2004), we also estimate relations using the probability of default as the 
dependent variable in place of the probability of delinquency or default (i.e., we adopt a more conservative definition of 
nonperformance).  Again, the signs and significance of the results are virtually unchanged. 
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P(Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijt) = h(Collateralijt, Collateralijt*Rel_Lengthijt, Rel_Lengthijt, 
                                                                                          Firmijt, Loanij, aj, gt ).                        (3) 
 
From a theoretical perspective, the measured effect of collateral on borrower risk in (2) and (3) is 
ambiguous.  Under the ex post theories, collateral is required of observably riskier borrowers who are more 
likely to pay higher interest rates and have performance problems.  But this effect could be offset – or even 
overturned – to the extent that collateral mitigates or eliminates the ex post frictions.  The effective priority of 
secured debt in bankruptcy mitigates incentives for moral hazard (e.g., it reduces asset/project substitution and 
prevents borrowers from obtaining additional debt which jeopardizes the lender’s claims) and reduces the 
lender’s loss given default (e.g., by increasing the seniority of secured debt over unsecured debt and by 
facilitating the repossession of the property and thus reducing foreclosure costs).  Hence, all else equal, the 
effective  priority  of  secured  debt  should  lead  to  smaller  loan  rate  premiums  (Smith  and  Warner  1979a, 
1979b). 
Under the ex ante private information theories, the measured effect of collateral is expected to be 
negative since it is the unobservably safer borrowers who pledge collateral more often and hence pay lower 
interest rates and are less likely to have performance problems.  Thus, a positive measured effect of collateral 
on risk premiums or ex post nonperformance would suggest a net empirical dominance of the ex post theories.  
By contrast, a negative measured effect would suggest either a net empirical dominance of the ex ante private 
information theories, an overcompensating effect of collateral under the ex post theories, or both.   
As in equation (1), we also include the interaction term between collateral and relationship length, 
Collateralijt*Rel_Lengthijt, because the ex ante theories are less likely to hold when the relationship is long and 
the bank has had time to discover more of the private information about the firm.  Thus, we expect a positive 
sign on the interaction term in equations (2) and (3), as the ex post theories are more likely to empirically 
dominate when relationships are longer.  All firm and loan control variables and bank and time fixed effects 
are the same as in equation (1).   
Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for equation (2) are presented in Table 4.  Column I reports a   16
benchmark  specification  without  the  collateral-relationship  length  interaction  term  or  loan  characteristics.  
Column II introduces the interaction term, and Column III also includes the potentially endogenous loan 
characteristics.  In all three specifications, we find strong negative relations between loan risk premiums and 
the incidence of collateral.  This suggests that borrowers pledging collateral generally receive a lower interest 
rate  –  consistent  with  either  a  net  empirical  dominance  of  the  ex  ante  private  information  theories,  an 
overcompensating effect of collateral under the ex post theories, or both.  However, it is also the case that this 
negative effect is mitigated to some extent by long-term borrower-lender relationships – suggesting that as 
private information is revealed over time the discounts dissipate (see Columns II and III).  Consistent with our 
previous findings, this result suggests that the ex post theories are more relevant when relationships are more 
established.   
  With respect to the control variables, we find that relationship length has a positive and statistically 
significant coefficient in Column I when an interaction term is not included, while it is essentially zero in 
Columns II and III.  We also find that firms organized as partnerships and corporations pay lower average 
loan risk premiums than sole proprietorships.  This is consistent with proprietorships generally being riskier 
and  more  informationally  opaque  than  other  types  of  firms.    Regarding  contract  terms,  it  appears  that 
installment loans carry higher interest rates, while larger loans and loans with longer maturities carry lower 
interest rates. 
Table 5 presents the results for ExPost_Nonperformanceijt, both in terms of the Probit coefficients and 
marginal effects.  Note that for this analysis, we drop all loans that do not mature before the end of the sample 
(December 2003); thereby leaving 29,485 bank loans.  Since this has the effect of reducing the average loan 
maturity in our sample, we also eliminate all loans originated during the last six months of the sample (July – 
December 2003) – further reducing the sample to 28,758 loans.   
  In Column I, collateral is positively associated with ex post delinquencies or defaults, consistent with 
net empirical dominance of the ex post theories.  The estimated marginal effect suggests a 4.1 percentage 
point increase in the probability of ex post nonperformance for secured loans.  This effect is economically 
significant, since the predicted probability of ex post nonperformance at the mean of all independent variables   17
(P0) is 4.7 percent.  This suggests that secured loans are almost twice as likely to have repayment problems as 
unsecured  loans.    However,  when  the  interaction  term  is  introduced  in  Column  II,  the  results  change 
substantially.  The coefficient on collateral becomes zero implying that there is no net effect of collateral 
when  the  customer  is  new  to  the  bank  (i.e.,  when  relationship  length  is  zero).    However,  the  positive 
coefficient of the interaction term implies that for longer relationships, the measured effect of collateral is 
positive.  This is again consistent with the net empirical dominance of the ex post theories for seasoned 
customers.   
The independent effect of relationship length is essentially zero in Column I when no interaction term 
is included.  The negative coefficient for relationship length in Columns II and III implies that when no 
collateral  is  pledged,  firms  with  longer  relationships  are  less  likely  to  have  nonperformance  problems, 
consistent with expectations that such borrowers are less risky.
18  With respect to the other control variables, 
we find that partnerships and corporations are more likely to have loan performance problems than sole 
proprietorships.    This  is  consistent  with  limited  liability  playing  a  role  in  default  decisions.    Regarding 
contract terms, it appears that installment loans and loans with longer maturities are associated with a higher 
incidence  of  repayment  problems.    Larger  loans,  by  contrast,  are  negatively  associated  with  ex  post 
nonperformance.   
As a robustness check, we re-estimate the specifications reported in Table 5 separately for loans with 
contract amounts above and below US$75,000.  Results are similar to those reported in Table 5.  We also re-
estimate the specifications reported in Table 5 after dropping all loans that appear to be renegotiations of 
previous loans.  (Recall that loans designated in the registry as renegotiations have already been excluded 
from this analysis.)  Including such loans could bias the estimated relations between ex post nonperformance 
and collateral.  This bias would arise in situations in which the borrower became distressed and the bank 
demanded that collateral is pledged, but recorded the adjustment as a new loan (see, for example, discussions 
in Smith 1993 and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Wruck 2002).  To identify such situations, we look for loans 
                                                 
18 Note that although borrowers with longer relationships appear to be less risky on average they do not pay lower risk 
premiums (see Columns II and III in Table 4).  This is consistent with the extraction of information rents as in Sharpe 
(1990)  and  von  Thadden  (2004).    See  also  Ioannidou  and  Ongena  (forthcoming)  for  evidence  consistent  with  this 
hypothesis.   18
that are originated right after another loan at the same bank terminates.  We identify 5,962 such loans, of 
which only 424 have collateral added.  Re-estimating equation (3) without these loans has no effect on our 
results.   
 
VI.  Conclusions 
The theoretical literature offers two broad classes of theories about why borrowers pledge collateral.  
The  first  set  of  theories  motivates  collateral  as  a  way  for  good  borrowers  to  signal  their  quality  under 
conditions  of  ex  ante  private  information.    The  second  set  of  theories  explains  collateral  as  an  optimal 
response to ex post contract frictions like moral hazard.  A growing body of literature that empirically tests 
these  models  and  the  on-going  financial  crisis  have  raised  significant  academic  and  policy  interest  in 
understanding the role of collateral in debt contracts. 
This  paper  improves  upon  the  empirical  literature  by  using  data  from  the  Bolivian  public  credit 
registry that provides us with important risk information about the borrower that is not known to the lender.  
Thus, we have both “private” and “public” information about the firm.  Using this information structure, we 
are able to construct measures of both observed and unobserved risk and hence more effectively test the two 
sets of collateral theories.  The data also allows us to explore the role of banking relationships and how 
information gleaned from relationships reduces private information.   
We present results that suggest roles for both sets of theories, although the ex ante private information 
theories appear to hold only for customers with short relationships that are relatively unknown to the lender.  
The data also suggest that the ex post theories tend to empirically dominate for firms with long relationships, 
where private information is less important.   
Our  analysis  represents  an  important  contribution  to  the  literature  seeking  to  understand  the 
motivation for collateral in debt contracts.  First, the issue has clearly been on the minds of market participants 
and policymakers in places like Japan and the United States owing to significant shocks to collateral values.  
Second, we use credit registry data that allows us to produce clean measures of private and public information, 
as well as providing a rich set of controls at the loan and bank level and bank and time fixed effects to account   19
for unobserved bank heterogeneity and changes in the lending environment, respectively.  Our approach might 
also be relevant to World Bank efforts to encourage the establishment of the development of credit registries 
in the developing world.  Our findings suggest that the information provided by such registries might be 
useful in eliminating the need for costly collateral.    20
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Appendix 
 
Our empirical analysis rests on the maintained assumption that past loan performance is predictive of 
future  loan  performance.    That  is,  borrowers  with  past  repayment  problems  are  more  likely  to  become 
delinquent or default on future loans.  To investigate whether  this assumption holds for our sample, we 
examine how our four measures of risk based on past repayment histories relate to the performance of new 
loans using the following Probit model: 
 
P(Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijt) = h(Observed_Riskijt, Unobserved_Riskijt,  
Rel_Lengthijt, Firmijt, Loanij, aj, gt ),    (A1) 
 
where Ex_Post_Nonperformanceijt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan is 30+ days overdue anytime 
after origination or if it enters default status.  All other variables are defined as in equation (1).  The model is 
estimated using the 28,758 loans that were originated prior to the last six months of the sample and matured 
before the end of the sample.  
The estimation results are presented in Table A1.
19  In Column I we report results from a benchmark 
specification  without  loan  characteristics,  while  Column  II  reports  results  from  a  model  including  loan 
characteristics.  Under the heading Probit Coefficients, we report the estimated coefficients of the two Probit 
specifications,  while  under  the  heading Marginal  Effects,  we  report the  change in  probability of ex  post 
nonperformance for each one of the independent variables, holding all other independent variables at their 
sample means.  For continuous variables, we report the effect for an infinitesimal change in the variable; and 
for dummy variables we report the estimated effect of a change from 0 to 1. 
In both specifications,  all  four  indicators  of borrower  risk  based  on  past repayment  histories  are 
positively correlated with repayment problems on the new loan.  This suggests that past performance is indeed 
predictive  of  future  performance.    Moreover,  considering  that  the  predicted  probability  of  the  new  loan 
                                                 
19 Results are similar if we estimate the model separately for loans above or below US$75,000. 
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becoming “nonperforming” (at the mean of all dependent variables, P0) is around 4%, the estimated marginal 
effects of these four risk indicators are quite large. 
 
Table A1 
Past Performance is Predictive of Future Performance 
This table reports Probit regressions for Ex Post Nonperformance, a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is 30+ days 
overdue anytime after its origination or if it is downgraded to the default status (i.e., given a rating of 5).  Under Probit 
Coefficients  we  report  the  estimated  coefficients  of  the  two  Probit  specifications.    Standard  errors,  corrected  for 
heteroskedasticity,  are  reported  between  brackets.    Under  Marginal  Effects  we  report  the  change  in  probability  of 
pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables.  For continuous variables we report the effect for an 
infinitesimal change in each independent variable and for dummy variables we report the estimated effect of a change 
from 0 to 1.  P0 is the predicted probability of ex post nonperformance, evaluated at the  mean of all independent 
variables.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
I II I II
Observed Risk
   Default_Observable_Registry 0.081 0.05 0.008 0.004
[0.189] [0.190] [0.019] [0.018]
   Npl_Observable_Registry 0.512 *** 0.546 *** 0.067 *** 0.071 ***
[0.045] [0.046] [0.008] [0.008]
   Npl_Observable_Relationship 0.729 *** 0.728 *** 0.109 *** 0.105 ***
[0.038] [0.038] [0.008] [0.008]
Unobserved Risk
   Npl_Unobservable 0.192 *** 0.216 *** 0.019 *** 0.021 ***
[0.035] [0.036] [0.004] [0.004]
Relationship Characteristic
   Rel_Length -0.073 *** -0.06 *** -0.007 *** -0.005 ***
[0.015] [0.016] [0.001] [0.001]
Borrower Characteristics
    Partnerships 0.169 *** 0.178 *** 0.017 *** 0.017 ***
[0.054] [0.055] [0.006] [0.006]
    Corporations 0.09 ** 0.125 *** 0.008 ** 0.01 ***
[0.044] [0.045] [0.004] [0.004]
    Other -0.091 -0.02 -0.008 -0.002
[0.110] [0.110] [0.008] [0.009]
Loan Characteristics
   Installment Loan 0.195 *** 0.017 ***
[0.036] [0.003]
   Loan Amount  -0.055 *** -0.005 ***
  [0.009] [0.001]
   Maturity  0.12 *** 0.01 ***
[0.021] [0.002]
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for Commercial Banks Operating in Bolivia 
 
This table provides summary statistics on all commercial banks that were active in Bolivia between March 1999 and 
December 2003.  Assets is equal to the average value of total assets in millions of US$ during the sample period. 
Deposits Share is equal to average ratio of bank deposits to the total deposits in the banking system.  Similarly, Loans 
Share is equal to the average ratio total bank loans to the total loans in the banking system.  The Capital Ratio reports the 
average ratio of total capital (Tier 1+Tier 2) to total risk-weighted assets.  The NPL Ratio is equal to each bank’s average 
ratio of nonperforming loans (delinquent of at least 30 days) to total loans.  Ownership indicates whether a bank is 
foreign- or domestically-owned and for foreign-owned whether it is a branch or subsidiary (B or S).  Banks for which at 
least 50 percent of their equity is foreign owned are defined as Foreign. 
Bank Name Assets Deposits Share Loans Share Capital Ratio NPL Ratio Ownership
Banco Santa Cruz 859.138 0.183 0.161 18.276 0.168 Foreign (S)
Banco Industrial 677.694 0.127 0.151 12.504 0.097 Domestic 
Banco Nacional de Bolivia 621.061 0.149 0.139 11.343 0.110 Domestic 
Banco Mercantil 598.541 0.142 0.125 12.076 0.091 Domestic
Banco de Crédito de Bolivia 591.024 0.134 0.126 13.985 0.130 Foreign (S)
Banco de la Unión 450.655 0.088 0.104 12.479 0.166 Domestic
Banco Económico 287.374 0.062 0.067 15.074 0.099 Domestic
Citibank 265.291 0.044 0.047 18.835 0.312 Foreign (B)
Banco Ganadero 205.477 0.042 0.046 11.888 0.105 Domestic
Banco Solidario 95.932 0.019 0.024 18.346 0.103 Foreign (S)
Banco do Brasil 31.771 0.005 0.003 54.374 0.071 Foreign (B)
Banco de la Nación Argentina 28.649 0.004 0.006 36.476 0.290 Foreign (B)
ABN Amro 22.341 0.003 0.003 42.520 0.050 Foreign (B)
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Table 2 
Variables and Summary Statistics 
 
The table reports the notation and definitions of variables used in the analysis, and summary statistics for all loans and for 
secured  and  unsecured  loans  separately.    With  the  exception  of  the  summary  statistics  for  the  variable 
ExPost_Nonperformance,  the  number  of  observations  is  32,286  for  all  loans,  7,864  for  secured  loans,  and  24,422  for 
unsecured loans.  For ExPost_Nonperformance the summary statistics use the number of loans that matured before the end of 
the sample period: 29,485 for all loans, 7,106 for secured loans, and 22,379 for unsecured loans.   
Variables Desctiption
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Collateral  = 1 if collateral was pledged at loan origination, and = 0 otherwise. 0.244 0.429 1.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
ExPost_Nonperformance  = 1 if a loan is 30+ days overdue anytime after origination or if it is 0.064 0.244 0.091 0.288 0.055 0.227
downgraded to the default status (a rating of 5), and = 0 otherwise.
Firm's Credit History
Observed Risk
  Default_Observable_Registry  = 1 if the borrower had defaulted on a loan anytime in the previous  0.003 0.052 0.004 0.067 0.002 0.046
 12 months with any lender, and = 0 otherwise.
  Npl_Observable_Registry  = 1 if the borrower had overdue payments of at least 30 days with  0.057 0.231 0.073 0.260 0.051 0.221
 any bank anytime from t-1 to t-2, and = 0 otherwise.
  Npl_Observable_Relationship  = 1 if the borrower had overdue payments of at least 30 days with  0.074 0.261 0.069 0.253 0.075 0.264
 the current bank anytime from t-3 to t-12, and = 0 otherwise.
Unobserved Risk
  Npl_Unobservable  = 1 if the borrower had overdue payments of at least 30 days with 0.140 0.347 0.158 0.365 0.134 0.340
 another bank anytime from t-3 to t-12, and = 0 otherwise.
Relationship Characteristic
   Rel_Length  Length of bank-firm relationship in months.  23.102 16.046 22.910 16.797 23.164 15.797
  Sole Proprietorship  = 1 if the firm is a sole proprietorship, and = 0 otherwise. 0.125 0.331 0.131 0.338 0.124 0.329
  Partnership  = 1 if the firm is a partnership (i.e., all or some partners have  0.140 0.347 0.136 0.343 0.141 0.348
 unlimited liability), and is = 0 otherwise.
  Corporation   = 1 if the firms is a corporation (i.e., all or some partners have  0.714 0.452 0.707 0.455 0.716 0.451
   limited liability), and is = 0 otherwise.
  Other  = 1 if the firm is a public company, a municipality, or a cultural,  0.020 0.142 0.026 0.158 0.019 0.136
 sport, religious associations, and is = 0 otherwise.
   Installment  = 1 if an installment loan and = 0 if a discount loan. 0.471 0.499 0.498 0.500 0.462 0.499
   Loan Amount  Loan amount at loan origination in US Dollars. 161,490 467,960 285,766 754,860 121,472 315,376
   Maturity  Number of months between loan origination and maturity. 11.880 16.308 16.444 24.162 10.411 12.440
   Interest Rate  Annual contractual interest rate at loan origination 13.449 2.886 12.783 3.127 13.664 2.770
   Loan Risk Premium  Interest rate minus the six-month U.S. Treasury Bill rate 9.763 2.563 9.410 2.962 9.877 2.409
Fixed Effects
Industry 
 Forestry and fishery;  Extraction of oil and gas; Minerals; Manufacturing; Electricity, gas, and water; Construction; Wholesale 
 and retail trade; Hotels and restaurants; Transport, storage, and communications; Financial Intermediation; Real estate 
 Activities of households as employees of domestic  personnel; Activities of extraterritorial organizations and bodies; Other
Region
 Santa Cruz, Beni, Pando, U.S., Argentina, Paraguay, Panama).
Bank  Set of dummy variables controlling for the bank that originated the loan. There are 13 banks.
Time  Set of dummy variables controlling for the time of loan origination. There are 57 months from 1999:03 to 2003:12.
Secured Unsecured All




 activities; Public administration defense, and compulsory social security; Education; Communal and personal social services; 
 Set of dummy variables controlling for the firm' s industry. There are 18 industry categories: Agriculture and cattle; Farming; 
Loan Characteristics
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Table 3 
Determinants of Collateral 
 
This table reports Probit regressions for Collateral, a dummy variable that equals one if the loan is secured and is equal 
to zero otherwise.  Under Probit Coefficients we report the estimated coefficients of the three Probit specifications.  
Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported between brackets.  Under Marginal Effects we report the 
change in probability of pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables.  For continuous variables we 
report  the  effect  for  an  infinitesimal  change  in  each  independent  variable  and  for  dummy  variables  we  report  the 
estimated effect of a change from 0 to 1.  P0  is the predicted probability that collateral is pledged evaluated at the mean 
of all independent variables.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Observed Risk
   Default_Observable_Registry 0.388 ** 0.369 ** 0.335 ** 0.128 ** 0.12 ** 0.104 **
[0.160] [0.161] [0.161] [0.058] [0.058] [0.056]
   Npl_Observable_Registry 0.222 *** 0.219 *** 0.262 *** 0.069 *** 0.068 *** 0.079 ***
[0.040] [0.040] [0.040] [0.013] [0.013] [0.013]
   Npl_Observable_Relationship 0.163 *** 0.144 *** 0.136 *** 0.05 *** 0.043 *** 0.039 ***
[0.035] [0.036] [0.037] [0.011] [0.011] [0.011]
Unobserved Risk
   Npl_Unobservable 0.043 -0.765 *** -0.622 *** 0.012 -0.17 *** -0.137 ***
[0.027] [0.094] [0.094] [0.008] [0.015] [0.016]
   Npl_Unobservable*Rel_Length 0.287 *** 0.243 *** 0.082 *** 0.067 ***
[0.031] [0.031] [0.009] [0.009]
Relationship Characteristic
   Rel_Length -0.148 *** -0.164 *** -0.131 *** -0.043 *** -0.047 *** -0.036 ***
[0.010] [0.010] [0.010] [0.003] [0.003] [0.003]
Firm Characteristics
    Partnerships -0.211 *** -0.214 *** -0.267 *** -0.057 *** -0.057 *** -0.067 ***
[0.037] [0.037] [0.038] [0.009] [0.009] [0.009]
    Corporations -0.074 *** -0.078 *** -0.153 *** -0.022 *** -0.023 *** -0.043 ***
[0.027] [0.027] [0.028] [0.008] [0.008] [0.008]
    Other 0.164 ** 0.154 ** -0.021 0.05 ** 0.047 ** -0.006
[0.065] [0.065] [0.068] [0.021] [0.021] [0.018]
Loan Characteristics
     Installment Loan -0.14 *** -0.038 ***
[0.025] [0.007]
     Loan Amount 0.141 *** 0.039 ***
[0.007] [0.002]
     Maturity 0.372 *** 0.102 ***
[0.015] [0.004]
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Table 4 
Determinants of Loan Risk Premiums 
 
This table reports OLS regressions for Risk_Premiumijt, which is defined at the loan interest rate less the six-month U.S.  
Treasury bill rate at the end of the same month. Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity, are reported between 
brackets.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 
   OLS Coefficients 
  I  II  III 
Loan Characteristics             
     Collateral  -0.419  ***  -0.664  ***  -0.292  *** 
  [0.034]    [0.085]    [0.079]   
     Collateral* Rel_Length      0.090  ***  0.076  *** 
      [0.029]    [0.027]   
             
Relationship Characteristic             
    Rel_Length  0.038  **  0.007    0.001   
  [0.015]    [0.017]    [0.015]   
             
Firm Characteristics             
    Partnerships  -0.245  ***  -0.245  ***  -0.103  ** 
  [0.046]    [0.046]    [0.043]   
    Corporations  -0.666  ***  -0.666  ***  -0.382  *** 
  [0.035]    [0.035]    [0.032]   
    Other  -0.384  ***  -0.372  ***  0.161  ** 
  [0.078]    [0.077]    [0.073]   
Other Loan Characteristics             
     Installment Loan          0.651  *** 
          [0.030]   
     Loan Amount          -0.528  *** 
          [0.009]   
     Maturity          -0.231  *** 
          [0.018]   
             
Industry, Region, Bank, and  
Time dummy variables included 
YES  YES  YES 
R-square  0.38  0.38  0.46 
Observations  32,286  32,286  32,286 
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Table 5 
Determinants of Ex Post Nonperformance 
 
This table reports Probit regressions for Ex Post Nonperformance, a dummy variable that equals one if a loan is 30+ days 
overdue anytime after its origination or if it is downgraded to the default status (i.e., given a rating of 5).  Under Probit 
Coefficients  we  report  the  estimated  coefficients  of  the  three  Probit  specifications.    Standard  errors,  corrected  for 
heteroskedasticity,  are  reported  between  brackets.    Under  Marginal  Effects  we  report  the  change  in  probability  of 
pledging collateral for each one of the independent variables.  For continuous variables we report the effect for an 
infinitesimal change in each independent variable and for dummy variables we report the estimated effect of a change 
from 0 to 1.  P0 is the predicted probability of ex post nonperformance, evaluated at the  mean of all independent 
variables.  ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Loan Characteristics
     Collateral 0.362 *** -0.04 -0.069 0.041 *** -0.004 -0.006
[0.031] [0.080] [0.082] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007]
     Collateral* Rel_Length 0.153 *** 0.154 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 ***
[0.028] [0.028] [0.003] [0.003]
Relationship Characteristic
    Rel_Length 0.01 -0.05 *** -0.041 ** 0.001 -0.005 *** -0.004 **
[0.016] [0.019] [0.019] [0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Firm Characteristics
    Partnerships 0.249 *** 0.25 *** 0.263 *** 0.028 *** 0.028 *** 0.029 ***
[0.052] [0.052] [0.053] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007]
    Corporations 0.127 *** 0.126 *** 0.16 *** 0.012 *** 0.012 *** 0.014 ***
[0.043] [0.043] [0.044] [0.004] [0.004] [0.004]
    Other -0.086 -0.08 -0.009 -0.008 -0.007 -0.001
[0.107] [0.107] [0.107] [0.009] [0.009] [0.010]
Other Loan Characteristics
     Installment Loan 0.188 *** 0.018 ***
[0.035] [0.003]
     Loan Amount -0.054 *** -0.005 ***
[0.009] [0.001]
     Maturity 0.076 *** 0.007 ***
[0.021] [0.002]
Industry, Region, Bank, and 









Probit Coefficients Marginal Effects
I II III
YES YES YES
I II III
28,729 28,729 28,729
0.11 0.11 0.12
 
 